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HOW DO THE ELDERLY FORM  EXPECTATIONS? 
AN ANALYSIS  OF RESPONSES  TO NEW INFORMATION 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper,  I  outline  and test a simple theory that describes  the 
evolution  of expectations  concerning  social security  benefits during  the 
pre-retirement  period.  After  correcting  for the presences  of measurement 
error,  I obtain  results that are consistent  with this theory:  expectations 
appear  to evolve  as a random  walk,  and innovations  in this process  are 
unrelated  to previously  available  information.  I also estimate  responses  of 
expectations  to the arrival  of new information.  Although previous  research 
indicates  that individuals  do not form  expectations  on the basis of all 
available  information  (and  in particular  ignore much of the information  con- 
tained  in concurrent  statutory  entitlements  to social  security  benefits), 
responses  to new information  during  the period  immediately  preceding  retire- 
ment appear  to be highly  rational.  The bulk of information  affects the 
evolution  of expectations  only through  its impact  on actual  benefit  calcula- 
tions.  Furthermore,  the data support  the view that individuals  form  accurate 
assessments  of the ultimate  impact  of new information  on actual  benefits. 
B. Douglas  Bernheim 
Kellogg  Graduate School 
of Management 
Northwestern  University 
2001 Sheridan  Road 
Evanston,  IL  60208 1.  INTRODUCTION 
A  large  fraction of the existing work on  the economics of aging 
aiid  the retirement period procedes on  the basis of life cycle assumptions, 
which  hold that individuals form very  rational  and deliberate long range 
plans.  Implicit in these assumptions is the notion that individuals develop 
well-informed opinions about  the economic  factors that will  affect their 
well-being in the future.  Despite the existence of a small body of work on 
the accuracy of expectations concerning social security benefits (Bernheim 
[1987a]),  the timing of retirement (Hall and  Johnson  [1970], Fames and 
Nestel  [1981],  Anderson,  Burkhauser,  and  Quinn  [1986],  Wolpin  and 
Göniil  [1987], and  Bernheim [1987b]),  and  inflation (see  Zarnowitz [1984] 
and the references  contained therein),  very  little is actually  known about 
the  manner  in  which  individuals  incorporate  new  information  into 
expectations. 
The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to examine the evolution  of  self- 
reported  expectations  about  social  security  benefits  during  the  pre- 
ret  irement  period,  and to examine the responses  of these expectations to 
the arrival of new information.  The central questions are as follows:  Do 
expectations  evolve  in  the manner  predicted by  theory?  What kind  of 
information leads individuals to revise their expectations, and what is the 
nature of the responses?  Are  revisions "rational", in the sense that they 
closely  resemble the effects of new information on objective measures  of 
expected benefits?  Since  models of consumer decision  making  inevitably 
invoke  a  host  of  assumptions  concerning  expectations,  these  questions 
logically precede any analysis of behavior.  I plan to study the relationship 
3 between self-reported expectations and behavior in subsequent work. 
The current investigation employs a data sample drawn from the 
Retirement History Survey.  The longitudinal nature of this survey makes 
it  possible to observe and  compare  expectations reported  by  the  same 
households at different points in  time,  and to relate observed changes to 
intervening events.  My central conclusions  are as follows. 
First,  a variety  of simple tests  appear  to reject the  most  basic 
implications of the theory that forms the basis  for  this  analysis.  As in 
Bernheim  [1987a],  I  attribute these  apparent  failures to  the  fact  that 
reported  expectations  are  extremely  noisy.  When  one  corrects for  the 
presence of reporting error  through the appropriate  use of instrumental 
variables, the resulting estimates are generally consistent with the theory. 
In particular,  one cannot reject the hypotheses that expectations evolve as 
a random walk, and that innovations in this process are unrelated to prior 
information. 
Having  concluded that  the  data are  supportive  of these  basic 
implications, I  use the theory to  formulate an empirical specification that 
relates changes in expectations to the arrival  of new information.  Using 
this  specification, I estimate  responses of expectations to  informational 
events,  and  test  for  the rationality of these responses.  The results  are 
striking.  Responses to  new  information  during  the period immediately 
preceding  retirement  appear  to  be  highly  rational.  The  bulk  of 
information  affects the evolution of expectations only through  its impact 
on actual benefit levels computed from contemporaneous benefit formulas 
and  earnings  histories.  Furthermore,  the data  support  the  view  that 
4 individuals  form  accurate  assessments of  the  ultimate  impact  of  new 
information on actual benefits. 
These results contrast  sharply with findings based upon  analyses 
of expected benefit levels,  rather than  changes  in  expected benefits.  In 
Bernheim  [1987a],  I  found  that  certain  variables  --  especially current 
statutory social security benefit entitlements -- were highly correlated with 
subsequent  forecast errors.  This  implies that  individuals  do not  make 
complete  use  of  all  the  information  contained  in  these  variables. 
Nevertheless,  these  same  individuals  are  very  good  at  processing 
information that arrives just prior to retirement.  Specifically,  while they 
are apparently incompletely informed about the level of benefits associated 
with contemporaneous benefit formulas, they revise expectations as if they 
understand how  new information  affects the benefits prescribed by  these 
formulas  on  I/ic  marg2n.  This result suggests that individuals formulate 
expectations  about  the  retirement  period  much  more  carefully  as 
retirement  approaches,  and  therefore  corroborates  some  speculative 
conclusions  based on  more  sketchy evidence  that  appeared in Bernheim 
[1987a].  At  the  same  time,  this  finding  supports  the hypothesis that, 
because individuals appreciate the links  between behavior and  benefits at 
the margin,  benefit formulas may have incentive effects.  This hypothesis 
has formed the basis for many previous studies of the retirement  decision- 
(see Hurd [19831). 
The remainder  of this  paper  is organized as  follows.  Section 2 
presents the basic model of expectations.  I  discuss  the data in  section 3. 
Section 4 contains tests of the model's central  implications, and section 5 
5 examines responses  of expectations to new information.  The paper closes 
with a brief conclusion. 
2.  A MODEL OF EXPECTA  TIONS 
Suppose  that  at  each  point  in  time  i,  an  individual  forms  an 
expectation, X, about the value of a variable X that is realized at some 
point in the future.  During period ,  he has access to certain information, 
which I denote  Throughout,  I assume that the individual's memory is 
perfect, so  that  all  information  available at  time  I  is  also available  in 
period  I + 1.  Formally,  = (1, w1+i),  where w11 represents 
information that becomes  available between periods I and I  +  1. 
In subsequent  sections,  I  interpret  X  as  social  security  benefits. 
When an individual reports expected social security benefits, there  is,  of 
course, some ambiguity  as to what  this  means.  While he may have  in 
mind  something like a  mathematical expectation, it is also possible  that 
his report reflects his view of the most likely outcome (i.e. the mode).  As 
long  as  the  distribution  of  X  is  approximately  symmetric  and  single- 
peaked, this ambiguity is probably of very little consequence.  However,  it 
is important  to bear  in  mind  that the mathematical  interpretation  that 
one places on a reported expectation becomes a joint hypothesis with any 
other proposition that one wishes to test.  In particular, failure of tests for 
"rationality"  (discussed below) could  simply  reflect misinterpretation  of 
the reported data.  With  this qualification in mind, I henceforth focus on 
the hypothesis that individuals report expected values, i.e. 
6 = 
where  is the expectations operator. 
From equation (1), it follows that 
(2)  (X+llQL)  =  =  4. 
This expression  describes  the stochastic evolution of expectations through 
time, and  is  the basis for the conclusion that expectations should follow  a 
random walk.  In particular, (2) implies that 
ye  —  ye  —  'L + 
where 
=  0. 
Furthermore,  +1 should be a function of new information received  since 
period t, Wt+l. 
The  analysis  of  this  paper  is  based  upon  the  simple  model 
described in  equations  (3)  and  (4).  Using these  as  the  basis  for  an 
empirical  specification, I  investigate  the  manner  in  which  expectations 
respond to new information.  The validity of my empirical results depends 
critically upon the  appropriateness of this  underlying  framework.  It  is 
therefore essential to test the framework as thoroughly as possible. 
7 Fortunately,  the  model  lends itself to a number  of direct  tests. 
Note that we can write 
(5)  Var(X7+i)  =  Var(X) +  Var(7)t+i) 
=  Var(X) +  Var(X7+i_X) 
>  Var(X). 
Two implications follow  directly from equation (5).  First, the population 
variance of expectations  reported at a particular  point in time should be 
greater  than the population  variance of expectations reported at  earlier 
points in time.  Second, the difference between these population variances 
should be exactly  the variance of their differences.  In Bernheim [1987a], I 
studied  the  first  of  these  implications, and  found  the data  somewhat 
supportive.  However,  since  the focus of that study  was  a comparison of 
expectations and realizations (rather than a comparison of expectations at 
different points in time), I did not consider the second implication. 
Equations  (3)  and  (4)  also  suggest  a  regression  format  that 
facilitates further  testing of the underlying model.  Suppose in  particular 
that we use ordinary least squares to estimate an equation of the form 
(6)  x7+1,1  =  a + 13x,e, + Q2,7 + 
where i indexes individuals.  Theory implies that we should obtain a = 7 
8 = 0 and fi = 1.  Furthermore, our estimate of  measures 4.  This test 
is  quite  demanding,  in  that  the  underlying  hypothesis  includes  the 
assertion that,  in  forming his  expectation, the individual  actually  uses  -- 
and  uses efficiently  -- all  information observed  by  the econometrician.  I 
therefore refer to it as a test of "strong" rationality.  One can also conduct 
a weaker, less demanding test by omitting the informational variables, and 
simply  regressing  X1 on  X.  Theory  implies that  the intercept  and 
slope coefficients should be zero and one, respectively.  This test allows for 
the possibility that individuals do not form expectations on the basis of all 
available information.  However,  the underlying hypothesis retains the key 
feature that expectations evolve as a random walk, responding only to new 
inforniation. 
If the tests of the underlying model  prove favorable, then one  can 
use  the  model  of  expectations  embodied  in  equations  (3)  and  (4)  to 
measure  responses  of expectations  to  new  information.  Since  is 
related exclusively to new information, I write it as a function of surprises: 
=  - 
Substitution into (3) yields an expression  for adjustments in expectations: 
x1 
— x =  — 
This in  turn suggests a regression of changes in  expectations on variables 
that  contain new  information  received  after period  i.  The  coefficients  in 
9 this regression  will reflect the magnitude of responses  to particular types of 
information.  Implementing this  strategy  is somewhat problemmatic, in 
that  all  variables  have  both  expected and  unexpected components, and 
therefore measure  blends  new  and  old information.  I  take  up  specific 
estimation issues in section  5. 
3.  DATA 
The  data  for  this  study  are  drawn  from  the  Social  Security 
Administration's  Retirement  History  Survey  (RHS),  which  followed  a 
sample of retirement-aged households (58 to 63  years old  in 1969) for a 
period of 10 years, beginning in 1969.  Each household was surveyed once 
every  two years (1969, 1971,  1973,  1975,  1977, and  1979).  Although the 
initial wave included more than 11,000 households, there  was substantial 
attrition over successive  waves. 
In  1969,  1971,  and  1973, respondents reported the level  of social 
security  benefits  that  they  expected  to  receive  upon  retirement.  In 
subsequent  sections,  the  variables  ESS71  and  ESS73  (expected  social 
security in  1971 and  1973, respectively) reflect answers to these questions, 
adjusted  to an annual  basis.  Inspection of the data for  1969 revealed a 
low response rate (due in part to survey skip patterns),  as well as a high 
frequency of nonsensical values.  I  have  therefore confined attention to 
responses  given  in  1971 and  1973.  In what  follows,  the variable CESS 
measures the change in expectations between these two years (i.e. CESS = 
ESS73 —  ESS71). 
Unfortunately,  interpretation  of expected  benefits  is  somewhat 
10 problematic, in  that the treatment  of inflation is ambiguous.  Certainly, 
the survey instrument  does not specify  whether the individual is to report 
a  real or nominal figure.  Throughout,  I simply assume that respondents 
report expected benefits in  current  (i.e.  survey year) dollars.  This seems 
the most  natural choice,  since respondents would  otherwise have  had to 
forecast  future  inflation  rates  before  formulating  an  answer  to  the 
question.  To  the  extent  my  assumption  is  incorrect,  the  scale  of 
expectations may vary somewhat between 1971 and 1973. 
Tests of the strong  rationality hypothesis, as  well  as some of the 
other exercises  conducted in section 5  of this paper, require the collection 
of informational variables that are candidates for  inclusion  in c.  In this 
paper,  I  employ  essentially  the  same  informational  variables  as  in 
Bernheim [1987a].  I group these into three distinct categories. 
The first category contains variables which measure other reported 
expectations.  These are natural candidates for inclusion in  since  they 
necessarily  reflect  information  that  the  individual  has  used  to  generate 
forecasts.  If any of these variables appear with significant coefficients  in 
estimates  of  equation  (6),  it  would  indicate  that,  at  a  minimum, 
individuals  use  different  kinds  of  information  to  form  different 
expectations.  Definitions of specific variables follow. 
ERETT1:  Expected date of retirement reported in 1971. 
ERET69:  Expected date of retirement reported in 1969. 
E0171:  Expected retirement income other than social security, 
reported in 1971. 
11 E0169:  Expected retirment income other than social security, 
reported in 1969. 
Data on  expectations  is,  of course, incomplete -- many  individuals  who 
report  expected  social  security benefits  do  not,  for  example,  report  an 
expected date of retirement.  Accordingly, I also  use dummy  variables, 
DRET71  and  DRET69,  which  equal  1  if  the  individual  reports  the 
associated expectation,  and  0  otherwise.  In  the final  sample  (described 
below),  all  individuals  responded to  questions about  retirement  income 
other than social  security, so  that  no companion dummies for the E0171 
and E0169 variables were required. 
The second category includes various demographic variables and 
other household characteristics which might be useful  in  predicting future 
social security benefits.  The list of variables includes: 
AGE:  The respondent's age. 
SAGE:  The respondent's wife's age. 
ED:  The respondent's education (measured in number of 
years). 
SED:  The respondent's wife's education. 
W:  The household's net wealth (including financial assets, 
businesses, and real property). 
HGOOD:  A dummy variable, indicating whether the respondent 
reports his  health as being better than average for his 
age (1 = better, 0 = other). 
12 HBAD:  A dummy variable, indicating whether the respondent 
reports his health as being worse than average for his 
age (1 = worse,  0 = other). 
KIDS:  Number of living children. 
COMPRET:  A dummy variable, indicating whether the 
respondent's employer maintains a compulsory 
retirement age (1 = yes, 0 = no). 
MOVE:  A dummy variable, indicating whether the respondent 
has moved within the past two years (1 = has moved, 
0  has not moved). 
The third and final category consists of a single variable, which is 
the individual's current  social  security entitlement,  CSS71,  defined as the 
level  of  benefits  he  would  receive  under  current  law  if  he  retired 
immediately.  CSS71 is, theoretically, part of each individual's information 
set  in  1971,  in  that it depends only upon  his own past  earnings history, 
and  upon current  law (which is public information).  Special treatment  of 
CSS71  is warranted  in  light  of my earlier  findings  (Bernheim  [1987a]), 
which  indicated  that  individuals  fail  to  use  much  of  the  information 
contained in  this variable, and furthermore that, quantitatively, this is by 
far the most important source of unused information. 
Since  this  study  focuses  on the responses  of expectations to new 
information, it  is  also essential to  compile a  list  of variables  that  are 
candidates for inclusion  in w. Each of the following variables describes 
some aspect of a change in  an individual's status between 1971 and  1973, 
13 and  could  conceivably  be  related  to  the  ultimate  realization  of social 
security benefits. 
HBET:  A dummy variable, indicating whether the self- 
reported index of health status improved (1 = 
improvement, 0 = other). 
HWOR:  A dummy variable, indicating whether the self- 
reported index of health status deteriorated (1 = 
deterioration, 0 = other). 
WIDM:  A dummy variable, indicating whether the wife died 
between 1971 and 1973 (1 = wife died, 0 = other). 
WIDW:  A dummy variable, indicating whether the husband 
died between 1971 and 1973 (1 = husband died, 0 
other). 
LJOB:  A dummy variable, indicating whether the respondent 
was employed  in 1971 but not in 1973 (1 = lost job, 0 
= other). 
GJOB:  A dummy variable, indicating whether the respondent 
was employed in 1973 but not in 1971 (1 = obtained 
job, 0 = other). 
CJOB:  A dummy variable, indicating that the respondent 
was employed in different jobs in 1971 and 1973 (1 = 
different jobs, 0 = other). 
NMOVE:  A dummy variable, indicated whether the respondent 
moved between 1971 and 1973 (1 = moved, 0 = 
other). 
14 CW:  The change is the respondent's wealth between 1971 
and  1973. 
CCSS:  The change in the respondent's statutory social 
security entitlement between 1971 and  1973. 
Finally,  while  the  focus  of  this  analysis  is  on  changes  in 
expectations (rather than on  the accuracy of expectations per se),  some of 
tl1e  exercises  in  section  5  require measures of ultimate realizations.  I 
calculate each  realization by applying the benefit formula in effect at the 
individual's  date  of  retirement  to  earnings  histories  from  matching 
administrative  records provided  by  the Social  Security  Administration. 
For details, I refer the reader to Bernheim  [1987a]. 
The  basic sample population  for  this  analysis consisted of RHS 
respondents who in 1971 were married and not yet receiving social security 
benefits.  Individuals  who  failed  to  report  expectations  about  social 
security beneflts in  1971, as well as a few  who reported non-sensical values 
(in  excess  of  $20,000  per  year)  were  dropped.  In  order  to  compare 
expectations across years, I restricted attention to respondents who still 
had not begun to receive social security benefits in 1973, and who reported 
an  expectation  in  that  year  as  well.  I  dropped  a  small  number  of 
observations for which  key variables (marital  status in  1973, health status 
in  1973, spouses age, number of children, and compulsory retirement) were 
either  missing,  or  non-sensical.  The  resulting  sample  contained  one 
individual who  failed  to report  an expectation  about  retirement  income 
other  than  social  security in either  1969 or  1971  -- rather than create a 
dummy  variable like  DRET71, I simply dropped  this observation.  This 
15 left a total of 370 observations. 
Since the sample used  here is a  rather small fraction of the total 
survey population, one naturally  wonders whether it is very representative. 
In particular, the majority of individuals fail to report expectations.  Non- 
reporting  might  itself  reflect  a  failure  to  think  seriously  about  the 
retirement process.  If so, statistical  analysis based on  the fraction of the 
sample that reports expectations may be very misleading. 
Fortunately,  non-reporting appears  to  be  fairly  random,  and  is 
perhaps more commonly attributable to fatigue resulting from the length 
of the survey instrument, or to the styles of different interviewers. If non- 
reporting  reflected a  failure  to  think  seriously about  and  plan  for  the 
retirement  period,  then  one  would  expect  non-reporting  of  expected 
benefits  and  non-reporting  of  expected  retirement  dates  to  be  highly 
correlated.  In  fact,  this is  not  the  case.  Of those  married  men  who 
reported expected social  security benefits in  1971,  42% also  reported an 
expected retirement date.  For those who did not report expected benefits 
in  1971, the figure was only slightly lower  (40%).  Of those who reported 
expected benefits in 1973,  34%  also  reported an expected retirement date. 
For  those who did not report  expected benefits in  1973, the figure was 
slightly  higher  (36%).  In  addition,  there  is  only a  mild  correlation 
between reporting of expected benefits in  1971, and reporting of expected 
benefits in 1973.  45% of married males reported expected benefits in 1971, 
as did 39% in  1973.  Of those who reported expected benefits in  1971, only 
49% also reported this expectation in 1973. 
One might also argue that those who reported expected benefits in 
16 both 1971 and  1973 could  be atypical.  Some insight into this issue can be 
gained from considering a few summary statistics.  Table 1 contains means 
and standard deviations for the variables that measure expectations about 
social  security  benefit  levels  (ESS71  and  ESS73),  the  change  in 
expectations  (CESS),  and  the  actual  realization  (SS).  Note  that  the 
average expected benefit; rose just over 2% between  1971 and  1973.  In 
1971, expectations were  about  10%  lower than realizations, while  in  1973 
they were about  8%  lower.  All of these numbers  (including the standard 
deviations)  coincide  very  closely  to  summary  statistics  presented  in 
Bernheim [1987aJ.  Those earlier calculations were based upon much larger 
samples,  due to the fact that it  was not  necessary  to restrict attention to 
respondents who reported expected benefits boLh in 1971  and in  1973  (in 
that paper, the object was  to compare expectations to realizations, rather 
than  to  subsequent  expectations).  The  similarity  of  these  summary 
statistics suggests  that the smaller sample is representative. 
Before passing on to analysis of the data, it is important to discuss 
two potential problems.  The first concerns sample selection biases.  Many 
of the criteria  for dropping observations are based on characteristics that 
were  observed in  1971.  In  principle, such  factors  are  part of  Q71,  the 
respondent's  information  set  in  1971,  and,  according  to  theory,  are 
therefore unrelated  to 
p173.  Sample selection of this sort  is  therefore not 
likely to produce systematic biases.  Other selection criteria are based on 
characteristics that; are observed after  1971.  In principle, these could be 
systematically related  to new information, and hence to 173.  In Bernheim 
[1987a], I argued that some of these  (e.g.  attrition due to death) are not 
17 likely to create significant problems.  Unfortunately, due  to  the nature of 
the current excercise,  I have had to impose  more demanding requirements 
on data  availability  during  the  period after  an  expectation  is  reported 
(most importantly,  the individual must report an expectation in  1973,  as 
well  as in 1971).  This  enhances  significantly the probability that  one or 
more of the selection criteria are in fact problematic.  I have  therefore 
given  some  explicit  attention  to  these  issues  in  the  econometric 
implementation. 
The  second  and  perhaps  more  serious  problem  concerns non- 
independence  of realizations.  Tests such as those described in section 2 are 
most commonly conducted with time series data on the same individual or 
set of individuals, so that, under the null  hypothesis, independence of the 
error terms  is  guaranteed.  When one  instead  relies  primarily  on  cross- 
sectional data from a short  panel such as the RIIS, theory  does not rule 
out systematic correlation of error terms across observations.  Correlation 
could arise for a variety of reasons. 
The  most  important potential  source of correlation  is  a  macro 
event  that  affects  a  significant  fraction  (perhaps  all)  of  the  sample 
simultaneously.  Suppose, for  example, that  subsequent to  the date at 
which  is  recorded,  Congress  unexpectedly  raises  benefits  by  20%. 
Assuming that individuals process  this information, one would presumably 
discover that on average ij  +1 is significantly positive.  Such an event did 
in fact occur in September 1972.  However,  this was for the most part an 
across-the-board increase  in benefit levels.  As a result, it probably affected 
little more than the scale of expectations.  To put it another  way, one 
18 would  not be surprised to find 3 > 1  in estimates of equation (6), and one 
should not construe this as contrary to theory.  Indeed, through estimates 
of 3,  one  can hope to  discern  the extent to which this  change was either 
anticipated  ex anie, or ignored ex posL  Finally, one would  still expect  to 
find n =  = 0  if the theory  is  accurate.  The data would  fail to satisfy 
these restrictions only if elements of 71 were related to the probability of 
processing information about the new law  (or processing it correctly), or to 
the nature  of behavioral responses to the law.  I  tend to discount both 
possibilities. In particular, the results in Bernheimn [1987a] suggest that the 
1972  legislation  was  largely anticipated,  and  the  summary  statistics  in 
Table 1 show little evidence of an upward surge in expectations after 1972. 
Furthermore,  the analyses of Burtless [1986]  and Bernheim [1987b] suggest 
that  the  impact  of the  1972  legislation  on the timing  of retirement was 
small. 
4.  TESTS OF THE MODEL 
In this  section,  I test various implications of the model presented 
in  section  2  using the data described in  section  3.  This nature of these 
tests is very similar to those in Bernheim  [1987a], except that in my earlier 
work I  focused  on the relationship between realizations and expectations, 
rather  than  between  expectations  at  different  points  in  time.  Many 
findings from  my earlier study  are relevant to, and corroborated by the 
results of this  section.  Most  importantly, the previous study  found that 
survey responses  to questions about expected benefits are quite noisy, and 
that failure to deal with  this  problem leads to apparent  rejection of the 
19 theory.  However,  when  the  noise is  treated  through  an  appropriate 
instrumental  variables technique, the results  are highly favorable to the 
hypothesis of weak rationality,  and  indeed indicate  that individuals are 
quite  good at forming expectations based upon the subset  of information 
that  they do use.  These issues reappear in the current context, and must 
be dealt with explicitly. 
4.1.  TESTS OF WEAK RATIONALITY 
Section  2  describes  a  theory  of information  processing.  That 
theory does not necessarily  assume or imply that individuals use all of the 
information that is in  principle available to them.  Fortunately,  even  in 
the  absence of  any  prior  knowledge  about  what  kinds  of  information 
individuals do and don't  use  to  form  expectations, the  theory still  has 
some testable implications.  As I have already discussed, there are several 
natural  tests based upon equation (5), and these certainly do  not require 
knowledge of  In  addition,  since  X  is  (trivially)  part  of  the 
information  set  used  in  forming  expectations  at  time  i,  expectations 
always  evolve  according  to  equation  (3),  where  in  place  of  (4)  we 
substitute 
=  0, 
(that is,  they always follow  a random walk).  Thus, another minimalistic 
test would be based upon ordinary least squares estimation of the equation 
(8)  X =  c + i3X7 + 
20 Regardless of what  contains, theory implies that a = 0  and  /9 =  1. 
This section  is devoted to the implementation of these tests. 
I  begin  with  tests  based  upon  equation  (5).  The  summary 
statistics  in  Table  1  are  certainly  consistent  with  the  prediction  that 
Var(X+i) >  Var(X),  and  indeed  this  corroborates  the  finding  of 
Beraheim  [1987a].  However,  on  the  basis  of these  statistics  it  is  also 
evident that support for the theory is superficial at best.  In particular, the 
difference  between  the  variances  cannot  equal  the  variance  of  the 
differences  (i.e.  Var(CESS)), since the latter by itself exceeds Var(ESS73). 
Indeed,  the  standard  deviation  of  ESS73  would  have  to be about  30% 
larger than its actual value in order to satisfy the equality in (5). 
One can make this same point through estimation of equation (8). 
Results for  ordinary least  squares are contained in  collumn  1  of Table  2. 
Note that the intercept is quantitatively large and statistically  significant, 
while  the slope is less  than one-half and  estimated with  great  precision. 
On the basis of these estimates, one  would be inclined to conclude that the 
data  resoundingly reject  even  the  simplest  implications  of our  central 
hypothesis. 
Fortunately,  this  negative  conclusion  is  premature.  As 
emphasized  in  Bernheim  [1987a],  much  evidence  indicates  that 
expectations about social security benefits are reported with a great deal of 
noise.  This may at first seem peculiar.  With a variable like wealth or 
income,  noise  may  arise  from  imprecise measurement  on  the part  of 
respondents.  In contrast, an individual creates his own expectations, and 
21 therefore cannot have any  problem measuring them.  There are, however, 
other  sources  of  noise.  Some  individuals  may  tend  to  exaggerate, 
reporting a higher number than they believe,  while others may be prone to 
understate  their  assets.  Alternatively,  individuals  may  use  relatively 
precise  figures when formulating  financial plans,  but  provide oniy  "ball 
park"  figures to interviewers.  Respondents might also think  in  terms of 
replacement rates  (i.e.  the percentage of pre-retirement income provided 
by social security) rather  than absolute levels, and may err in the process 
of  converting  one  to  the  other.  Finally,  some  noise is  undoubtably 
attributable to recording and coding errors. 
The  analysis of my  previous paper  established that  a  standard 
errors-in-variables  specification,  combined  with  the  basic  theory  of 
expectations  outlined  above,  explained  the  relationship  between 
expectations and realizations rather well.  It is therefore quite possible that 
reporting error also accounts for the apparent  failure of the theory in the 
current context. 
Unfortunately, one cannot in the absence of additional information 
adjust the tests based on equation (5) for the presence  of reporting error. 
Nevertheless,  one  can "back out"  the variance of the measurement error 
that would  make the observed  variances consistent with  theory.  This is 
accomplished as follows. 
Suppose that for each  r we observe X., which is related to X. as 
follows: 
=  XCr+pr, 
22 where  p1-  is uncorrelated  with  X..  Suppose  further  that  the u-  are 
independently  and  identically  distributed,  with  variance  Then 
equation (5) implies that 
Var1) 
—  =  Var() + Var(31 
—  — 33 
From this expression,  it follows that 
2  —  Var() +  —  —  Var(1) 
—  2 
Substitution  of the summary  statistics  from  Table  1  into  this  formula 
reveals  that  = 682,  so  that  approximately  60%  of  the  variance  in 
ESS71,  and  35% of the variance in ESS73  is attributable to measurement 
error. 
\'Vhile the preceding calculation assumes the existence of reporting 
error, one can actually test this hypothesis through estimation of equation 
(8).  The  standard  prescription  for  reporting  error  is  to  employ 
instrumental  variables.  One  requires that the instrument is uncorrelated 
with  both  and p,  but  correlated  with  X.  Accordingly, valid 
instruments  must  be related  to  information which the individual actually 
uses to construct X.  Thus, one  necessarily tests the basic theory and the 
measurement error hypothesis jointly with the assumption that individuals 
actually  use certain information (i.e.  that contained in the instruments) in 
a manner consistent with theory. 
23 The second column in Table  2 contains estimates of (8) for which 
I have  instrumented  ESS71  with  measures of other expectations  (i.e.  the 
first group of variables discussed in section 3 as candidates for inclusion in 
The use of these variables as instruments is based upon the plausible 
assumption that individuals' expectations are internally consistent, in the 
sense that all expectations are based on the same information.  The results 
in  Bernheim [1987a] lend  strong support  to  this assumption.  Note that 
the  estimated  coefficients  change  dramatically.  The  intercept  is  now 
negative and statistically  insignificant, while  the slope coefficient  rises  to 
1.27 and is statistically indestinguishable from unity. 
The third column in Table 2 contains estimates of (8) for which I 
have  instrumented  ESS71  with  various socio-economic  and demographic 
variables  (i.e.  the  second  group  of  variables  discussed  in  section  3  as 
candidates for inclusion  in c?).  The use  of these variables as instruments 
is supported  by  the findings in  Bernheim [1987a] -- while  individuals do 
not  appear  to  use  all  of this  information  efficiently,  the extent of the 
departure  from  theory  is  not  of much  quantitative importance.  Once 
again,  the  estimated  coefficients  change  dramatically.  The  intercept 
becomes negative and statistically insignificant, while the slope coefficient 
rises to 1.16 and is statistically indistinguishable from unity. 
For both sets of estimates, one cannot reject the hypothesis that c 
= 0 and 3 = I at reasonable levels of confidence.  Of course, this is in 
large part due to the fact that standard errors are enormous.  By  itself, 
this  evidence is only weakly  supportive of the underlying hypotheses.  It 
becomes far  more  persuasive in  the  context  of  my  earlier  results.  In 
24 regressions of realizations on expectations (see Bernheim [1987aJ), precisely 
the  same  pattern emerged --  simple  regressions  produced large  positive 
intercepts  and  slope  coefficients  of  roughly  0.5,  while  instrumental 
variables techniques drove the intercepts towards zero and generated slope 
coefficients  of about 1.1.  Furthermore, since the earlier study made use of 
much  larger  samples, the precision  of these estimates  was  substantially 
greater.  The  fact  that  the  predicted  pattern  arises  in  two  different 
estimation  contexts  lends  strong  support  to  the  underlying  joint 
hypotheses. 
It  is  also possible  to  "back out"  estimates  of  from  the  IV 
results.  Standard calculations reveal that the bias in the OLS estimate of 
the  slope  parameter  is  proportional  to  the  noise-to-signal  ratio. 
Furthermore,  the IV estimates are consistent.  Using these facts, it is easy 
to show  that 
& (1 
—  o1s'iv) 
yields a consistent estimate of c, where  is the population variance of 
X, and  and  are respectively  the OLS  and  IV estimates of 3. 
The preceding paragraphs describe two sets of IV results.  For the first set, 
the implied value of  is 728,  while  for the second it is 712.  Since the 
estimated  j3's are quite  close to unity,  these values are not far from the 
figure derived from equation (5)  (i.e. 682).  Moreover, one can undertake a 
similar exercise for the regressions  of realizations on expectations contained 
in  Bernheim  [1987a].  The  implied variance for  measurement  error  for 
25 1971  is 660,  which  is in the same  ballpark.  The striking similarity  of 
estimates  obtained  from  two  distinct  empirical  excercises  again  lends 
support to the joint hypotheses outlined above. 
In section 3,  I mentioned that  this analysis suffers  from potential 
sample selection problems.  To assess the importance of these factors,  I 
introduced a statistical  correction based  upon the procedure outlined by 
Heckman  [1976].  First,  I  created a larger data  sample containing  the 
original sample plus all the observations that were excluded on the basis of 
characteristics observed after 1971.  Next, I estimated a probit relationship 
that  explained  inclusion  in  the  original  sample  as  a  function  of  the 
instrument list, and  used  these estimates to form inverse  Mill's ratios.  I 
then  augmented  equation  (8)  with  the  inverse  Mill's  ratio term  and 
estimated  it  with  two-stage-least-squares,  using  both  the  original 
instrument list and the inverse  Mill's ratio as instruments.  This procedure 
treats both  the endogeneity of ESS71  and the sample selection problem 
simultaneously, and yields consistent estimates. 
Results for  the  two  instrument  lists  discussed above appear  in 
columns 4 and 5 of Table 2.  While the slope coefficients  rise slightly, this 
change is dwarfed  by the original standard errors.  In addition,  the Mill's 
ratios do not appear to enter  significantly (note however that I have not 
adjusted the standard  errors for the fact that these terms are estimated, 
rather than observed).  Overall, the sample selection correction appears to 
make very little quantitative or qualitative difference. Indeed, none of the 
estimates  in  this paper  were significantly affected by  the introduction  of 
similar  corrections.  In  subsequent sections,  I  have  conserved space  by 
26 presenting only  uncorrected  OLS  and  IV  estimates.  Results  based  on 
sample selection corrections are available upon request. 
In summary, the data are consistent with the hypothesis of weak 
rationality.  This fact is obscured by the presence  of significant reporting 
error,  which  biases  simple  regression  estimates,  and  leads  to  apparent 
rejections of the theory.  Unfortunately, estimates  which correct for  the 
presence  of measurement error are imprecise,  so  that the associated tests 
have little power.  However,  taken in conjunction with previous work, this 
analysis validates the use of weak  rationality as a maintained  hypothesis 
in subsequent sections. 
4.2.  TESTS OF STRONG RATIONALITY 
In my previous study of expectations and  realizations (Bernheim 
[1987a]),  I found that while the data were consistent with the hypothesis 
of weak rationality,  they were highly inconsistent with strong rationality. 
In  particular,  individuals  appeared  to  ignore much  of  the  information 
contained in current statutory entitlements, and to a lesser extent failed to 
make complete use of several socio-economic variables. 
In  the current  context,  tests  of strong  rationality  have  a  much 
different flavor.  To understand these differences, consider equation (6).  If 
we replace X7 with X (so that the equation explains realizations rather 
than later expectations), then any failure to process  information contained 
in  should show  up as non-zero components in the coefficient vector . 
however,  as the equation  stands,  elements of y  will  be non-zero only if 
either  (i)  individuals  are  slow  to  adjust  expectations,  and  incorporate 
27 certain  aspects  of  into  their forecasts sometime  after  period  I  and 
before period 1+1, or (ii) individuals ignore elements of  that are useful 
in  predicting events that these  individuals  will subsequently incorporate 
into their forecasts.  Failure to reject the hypothesis that  = 0  does not, 
in  the  current  context,  imply  that  individuals  process  all  information 
correctly.  Most  obviously, if individuals never adjust  their expectations, 
then  we will certainly estimate  'y  = 0, despite the fact  that expectations 
are not informationally effieient.  Thus, the tests of strong rationality have 
power against a much narrower range of alternatives in the current context 
than in my earlier paper. 
I implement these tests  through estimation  of equation  (6).  In 
light  of my  conclusions  concerning  the presence of reporting error, it  is 
hardly surprising that OLS estimates of (6) are highly at variance with the 
theory.  I therefore omit these results, and turn directly to procedures that 
correct for this problem. 
There are two  alternative  methods of dealing with measurement 
error.  First, one can impose  the constraint that  =  1,  thereby moving 
X7 to the left hand side of the equation.  The term p1  then becomes part 
of the standard regression error; while it renders the estimates less precise, 
it does not affect consistency.  One can then test the hypotheses that a = 
7 = 0.  Second, one can estimate  (6)  with instrumental  variables.  It is 
then possible  to test all of the relevant constraints (including  = 1).  The 
drawback of this approach  is  that, as in the previous section,  in order to 
identify instruments  one  must  maintain  the hypothesis that individuals 
actually use certain information. 
28 Table  3  contains  the  results  of the  procedures outlined  in  the 
preceding paragraph.  Estimates  in  the  first  column are  generated  by 
regressing  the  change  in  expectations  (CESS)  on  the  full  list  of 
informational variables.  Note  that none of the corresponding coefficients 
is significant at the 95%  level of confidence.  Even  CSS71,  which played 
such  a large role  in  my earlier analysis of expectations and realizations, 
appears to explain very little of the change in expectations.  In fact, the F- 
statistic for the hypothesis that  y = 0 is 0.834,  and  the F-statistic for the 
joint hypotheses that a =  = 0 is 0.829, so that it is impossible to reject 
strong rationality at any standard level of confidence. 
Failure to reject might, of course, be attributable to imprecision. 
It is therefore appropriate to consider the magnitudes of point estimates. 
Certain coefficients  stand out as  very  large relative to the mean value of 
expected  benefits.  The  most  notable  among  these  are  DRET71  and 
DRET69.  The reason for this is simply that the variables ERET71 and 
ERET69 have also been included in the regression.  Since the mean value 
of ERET71 is around 74, the product of this variable with its coefficient  is 
typically around  2900.  The corresponding dummy variable simply takes 
out  the  mean  of this  product  so  that  the  fitted  value  of CESS is not 
substantially different for those who do and do not report ERET71.  Since 
the t-statistic for the coefficient of ERET71 is small, the standard error for 
the coefficient of DRET71 must be enormous. 
Other  variables  with  quantitatively  significant  coefficients are 
HGOOD, HBAD,  COMPRET, and MOVE.  Of these, only the coefficient 
of  COMPRET  approaches  statistical  significance.  Nevertheless,  it  is 
29 somewhat disturbing that the standard deviations of these coefficients  are 
so large.  For example, although the point estimates indicate that a recent 
move is associated with roughly an 8% decline in expected benefits during 
the subsequent  period, we  are  unable to determine  with  any  reasonable 
confidence whether or not this association is the result of chance. 
The second column of Table  2  contains IV  estimates, where the 
instrument list consists of other reported expectations (i.e.  the first  set of 
variables  listed  in  section  3  as  candidates  for  inclusion  in  '2t)  The 
coefficient  of  ESS71  is  only  slightly  changed  from  the  corresponding 
regression  in  Table  2.  Of  the  various  informational  variables,  only 
COMPRET appears with a significant coefficient.  Of course, with a large 
number of informational variables, it is hardly surprising that one should 
appear with a coefficient that is significant at the 95% level of confidence. 
A  formal test of the hypothesis that  none  of the informational variables 
matters  (-y = 0)  reveals  that  this  hypothesis  cannot  be  rejected. 
Similarly, the data fail to reject the full implications of strong rationality - 
- a =  = 0 and/I = 0--at the 95% level of confidence. 
These conclusions follow  with  even  greater  force  from estimates 
based  on  the use of socio-economic  and  demographic variables (i.e.  the 
second set of variables listed in section 3 as candidates for inclusion  in 
as  instruments.  The  associated results  appear  in  the  third  column of 
Table 3.  Note that the intercept is nearly 0, that the estimate of /3 differs 
only  slightly  from  unity,  and  that none of the informational  variables 
appears  with either a statistically significant or quantitatively  important 
coefficient (recall my earlier comments concerning the interpretation  of the 
30 coefficient  for  DRET71).  Not  surprisingly,  one  cannot  reject  the 
hypothesis of strong rationality on the basis of these estimates. 
Taken together, these results bear out the strongest implications of 
the  theory  outlined in section  2.  One should,  however,  be  cautious in 
interpreting these results.  In this regard, it is worth  reiterating some of 
the opening remarks for  this subsection.  This evidence suggests that  we 
can  rule  out  the  possibilities  that  (i)  individuals  incorporate  certain 
information into their expectations only  after a  lag, and  (ii) information 
that individuals fail to use is highly correlated with subsequent events that 
they do incorporate into their expectations.  The evidence does not allow 
us  to  conclude  that  individuals  make  efficient  use  of  all  available 
information,  and  indeed  the  results  of  Bernheim  [1987a]  suggest  the 
contrary. 
5.  RESPONSES TO NEW  INFORMA  TION 
The analysis of section 4 lends support to the theoretical model of 
expectations outlined in section 2.  Unfortunately, it does not tell us very 
much  about  the  manner  in which individuals process new information. 
For  example,  this  evidence  does  not  rule  out  the  possibility  that 
individuals  form  expectations  at  some  early  date, and  thereafter  cling 
stubbornly to their original forecasts,  ignoring  all  new information.  The 
current section is therefore devoted to an analysis of the manner in which 
new infomation affects the evolution of expectations. 
On the basis of the simple summary statistics in Table 2, it seems 
apparent that some adjustment of expectations occurs.  For one thing, the 
31 variance  of  CESS  is  very  large.  Of  course,  this  could  be  partly 
attributable to  the fact that both ESS71  and ESS73 contain measurement 
error  --  indeed,  the  observed  variance of CESS  could  in  principle be 
entirely spurious.  If the variance of measurement error remains constant 
over time,  then the variance of  CESS  simply equals the variance of the 
true  change  in  expectations  plus  two  times  the  variance  of  the 
measurement  error,  u.  In  section  4.1,  I  presented  several different 
estimates of Cp, all of which clustered around 700.  Combining this figure 
with  the  observed standard error of CESS, it is  possible  to recover  the 
variance of the true change in  expectations.  Specifically,  I calculate the 
standard error of the true change to be 728.  Thus, individuals appear to 
have adjusted their expectations significantly between 1971 and  1973.  One 
can illustrate this same point simply by comparing the variances of ESS71 
and  ESS73  --  unless  measurement error  increased  dramatically  between 
these  years,  the  rise  in  variance  must  reflect  the  processing  of  new 
information. 
The observations raise two important  questions.  First,  what kind 
of information  leads  individuals to  revise  their expectations, and  what is 
the  nature  of  the  response?  Second,  do  individuals  process  new 
information  "rationally",  in  the  sense  that the  adjustment  of observed 
expectations closely resembles an adjustment to some objective expectation 
of the realized value?  The next two subsections are devoted to analyses of 
these questions. 
32 5.1.  MEASUREMENT OF RESPONSES 
The starting  point for  this analysis is equation  (7), which  relates 
changes in  expectations to unanticipated events.  To the extent that  such 
events determine subsequent earnings, applicable statutes,  or the timing of 
retirement,  they  may  also  have  large  impacts  on  eventual  benefits. 
Estimation  of equation  (7)  requires some notion of what the function 
looks like, as well as some technique for distinguishing between anticipated 
and  unanticipated events.  Lacking  any prior information about  the form 
of ,  I  simply estimate a linear approximation.  In  addition, I try out 
three different procedures for measuring unanticipated events. 
It  is  natural  to  begin  with  the  simple  assumption  that 
expectations  are  largely  myopic,  so  that  any  change  in  status  is 
unanticipated.  This motivates a regression  of CESS on the set of variables 
listed in section 2  as candidates for inclusion  in  Since  my earlier 
study  (Bernheim  [1987a])  suggested  that individuals ignore much of the 
information  contained  in  current  statutory entitlements,  I begin with a 
regression that omits CCSS  (the change in  current entitlement)  from this 
list.  The results appear in column 1 of Table 4. 
Only one of the variables in this regression --  WIDW --  appears 
with  a  coefficient  that is significant at the conventional 95% confidence 
level.  However,  many  of the other  coefficients  have  t-statistics  in  the 
neighborhood of 1.5.  It is  therefore not surprising that the F-statistic for 
the hypothesis that all of these coefficients  equal  zero is 2.09, which is 
significant  at the  95%  level  of  confidence.  This joint  hypothesis test 
indicates that some of the change in  expectations observed between 1971 
33 and 1973 is a response to the information contained in these variables. 
It is also clear that the lack of statistical significance for a number 
of  individual  coefficients  reflects  imprecision, rather  than  small  point 
estimates.  Several  of  the  dummy  variables  have  coefficients  in  the 
neighborhood of 600,  which  indicates that the event changes  expectations 
by about 25% of its mean value.  Nevertheless, standard errors are simply 
too  large  to  say  with  confidence  that  the  specific  event  (as  opposed to 
events collectively) has an impact  on expectations.  Unfortunately, several 
coefficients  also  have  counterintuitive signs.  Specifically,  finding  a job 
depresses expected benefits, while losing a job raises them. 
It  is  particularly  interesting  to  compare  these  results  with  the 
second column of Table 4,  which  differs from the first only in that I have 
added  CCSS  (the change  in  statutory entitlement).  Note  first  that  the 
coefficient  of this  variable is statistically significant, which indicates that 
individuals do to some extent process information that affects their benefit 
levels through the benefit formulas.  Furthermore,  the addition of CCSS 
renders all  other  coefficients individually insignificant.  Indeed,  the  F- 
statistic for the hypothesis that all of these other coefficients  equal zero is 
1.71,  which is significant at the 90% confidence level, but not at the 95% 
level.  Closer inspection reveals that the introduction of CCSS renders the 
other coefficients jointly insignificant by  reducing the estimated  effects of 
several  key  variables  (especially  GJOB  and  WJDW),  rather  than  by 
reducing the precision  of these coefficients. 
These results  raise  the  interesting possibility  that  events  affect 
expectations  only  through  their impacts on  actual  benefit calculations. 
34 This  would  entail  a very  high degree  of rationality  with  respect  to the 
processing  of  information  received  on  the  margin  --  certainly  a  much 
greater degree of rationality than was apparent  in my analysis of the levels 
of expectations (see  Bernheim  [1987a]).  Much of the following analysis is 
designed to investigate this possibility  in greater detail. 
The problem with the preceding set of estimates is, of course, that 
much of the observed changes  in status may have been anticipated.  This 
is  especially  important  for  the  CCSS  variable,  in  that  statutory 
entitlements  (what  an  individual  would  obtain  upon  immediate 
retirement) rise steeply during the period immediately prior to retirement. 
Thus, much of the change in CSS may have been anticipated.  This would 
tend to bias the coefficient  of CSS toward 0, thereby overstating the extent 
to which  other events impacted expectations through channels other  than 
the benefit formulas. 
The next  logical  step  is therefore to reestimate this  specification 
using a more elaborate model  for  distinguishing between anticipated and 
unanticipated events.  The object is to measure the component of an event 
that is unanticipated,  given  whatever method  individuals actually use to 
forecast these events.  Since  we do know  that individuals use information 
contained in ESS71,  one possibility is to forecast (through regressions)  the 
informational  events on  the basis of  ESS71,  and  to  use the residuals as 
measures of the unanticipated components. 
Results  based  on  this  procedure appear  in  the  third column  of 
Table  4.  The list of independent variables should now  be interpreted  as 
measures of unanticipated  changes,  constructed as described above.  Note 
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now exceeds 5.  In addition,  the absolute value of every  other coefficient 
declines,  in  some  cases  very  significantly,  and  none  of  these  other 
coefficients  is  even  close  to  being  statistically  significant.  Jointly,  the 
significance  of these other coefficients  is no longer even marginal -- the F- 
statistic for the hypothesis that they all equal zero is 0.65,  which  does not 
permit rejection at any meaningful level of confidence. 
Even with this second procedure,  measures of unanticipated events 
may still contain anticipated components.  I  therefore implement a third 
procedure in which the informational events are regressed  on the full array 
of variables listed in section 3 as candidates for inclusion in  as well as 
on ESS71.  I then use the residuals from these variables as measures of the 
unanticipated  changes.  The justification for  this  procedure is that it is 
better  to  overexplain,  rather than  underexplain the  changes in  status 
between  1971  and  1973.  If  one  uses  more  information  than  do  the 
respondents, then one's prediction will better  than  theirs, and the residual 
will  then certainly reflect only unanticipated changes in status.  Since the 
respondents'  forecasts are presumed to  be inferior, part of the predicted 
change will  also be unanticipated.  Fortunately, the nature  of regression 
analysis  is  such  that  these  other  unanticipated  components  must  be 
orthogonal  to  the  residuals,  and  consequently  the  omission  of  these 
components will not bias the coefficients  in a regression of CESS on the 
residuals. 
The results of this procedure appear in column 4 of Table 4.  The 
coefficient  of CCSS  again  increases  significantly to 0.546,  and  it remains 
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continue to decline  significantly for  WIDM, WIDW, GJOB, and  CJOB. 
In  fact,  for  WIDW,  the  coefficient  is  reduced  practically  to zero.  In 
contrast,  the  coefficients  for  HBET  and  NMOVE rise  somewhat.  The 
statistical significance of these other individual coefficients continues to be 
low,  and  one cannot  reject  the joint hypothesis that they are all  zero at 
any reasonable level of confidence. 
Note  that  the  second  and  third  procedures  described  above 
implicitly treat the increase  in average benefits between 1971 and  1973 as 
anticipated.  Thus,  the  relative  importance  of CCSS  does  not  simply 
reflect the fact  that most individuals were  aware of the benefit increase, 
and  adjusted their expectations accordingly.  Rather, these results suggest 
that  cross-sectional  variation  in  unanticipated  changes  of  statutory 
entitlements  is  the  most  important  factor  explaining  cross-sectional 
variation in changes of expected benefits. 
Two qualifications are in  order.  First, for  the second and third 
procedures I have not  adjusted the standard errors for  the fact  that the 
residuals are estimated,  rather than observed.  It is in principle possible  to 
obtain  correct  standard errors,  as  well  as more  efficient  estimates,  by 
estimating  the entire system simultaneously through the use of seemingly- 
unrelated-regression  (SUR)  techniques.  Unfortunately,  computational 
requirements for SUR estimation of the full system exceeded the capacity 
of  the  available  computer  facilities.  Second,  the  power  of  the  tests 
discussed above is questionable in light of the fact that the standard errors 
of many coefficients are, from an economic  point of view, extremely large. 
37 Nevertheless,  the  general  pattern of results,  and  especially  the 
progression of coefficients through the second, third, and fourth columns in 
Table 4, lends significant support  to  a remarkable conclusion: despite the 
fact  that  individuals do  not  appear  to use all  information  contained  in 
their statutory entitlements,  the  bulk  of new, marginal  information  is 
incorporated into expectations through its effect on statutory entitlements. 
Although individuals do not appear to be well informed about the level of 
benefits,  they  appear  to  have a  very  good  sense  for  how  the  benefit 
formulas operate on the margin. 
The  remaining  question  is  whether  these  responses  to  new 
information  are  rational,  in  the  sense  that  they  closely  resemble 
adjustments  to  an  objective  measure  of  expected  benefits.  Even  if 
individuals incorporate new  information as  if they evaluate its impact  on 
statutory entitlements, it is still possible that they do not fully exploit this 
information,  or  that  they  misperceive  the  relationship  between 
entitlements  and  ultimate  benefits.  These issues  are  the subjects of the 
next subsection. 
5.2.  EVALUATION OF RESPONSE QUALITY 
In order to test the rationality of responses to new information, it 
is necessary to  add  some additional  structure to the basic model.  I  will 
suppose that the objective expectation concerning  the realization of X is 
given  by a linear function of information: 
= 
38 When  new  information  arrives,  the  objective  expectation  adjusts  in 
response  to unanticipated shocks.  In particular, I suppose that 
(9)  =  +  — 
I  now  allow  for  the possibility that  reported expectations  differ 
from  objective  expectations.  Suppose  in  particular  that  subjective 
expectations are given not by equation (9), but rather by 
(10)  =  + H+i 
— 
Then, combining (9) and (10), and using the fact that 
X  =  + 
where v is uncorrelated with  we have 
(11)  X — X = 




02) + v. 
The empirical analysis in Bernheim {1987a]  established that individuals do 
not  process  all available information in a fully rational manner (i.e. i 
— 
0).  In this paper, I focus on the processing  of new information  (i.e. 
on the value of  — 
02). 
39 To estimate the value of  —  I regress the forecast error from 
expectations reported in  1973 on  the  1971 information set,  as  well  as on 
measures of unanticipated events that occurred in the intervening period. 
I  present estimates of equation (11) based upon the three distinct methods 
of measuring unanticipated  events discussed in  the preceding  subsection. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  use  of  the  first  two  procedures does  not 
conform  strictly to the theory outlined above. 
Results appear  in  Table  5.  In  order to conserve space, I have 
omitted  coefficients for all of the Q variables, and concentrate exclusively 
on the effects of new information.  It is worth mentioning that the pattern 
of coefficients for the  variables was very similar to that obtained in my 
previous  study.  Most  importantly,  CSS71  entered  with  a  positive, 
economically  significant, and statistically significant coefficient,  indicating 
that  individuals  fail  to  process  all  of  the  information  contained  in 
statutory entitlements. 
The first  thing to notice about Table 5  is that the results differ 
very  little across the three  procedures.  There  is a particularly  striking 
similarity between the second and and third set of estimates.  This should 
not be surprising -- were it not for the presence  of ESS71 in the first stage 
regressions,  the  independent  variables  would  be  related  by  a  linear 
transformation,  and  the  estimated  coefficients  for  the  new  information 
variables  would  in fact be identical  across procedures.  The second and 
third sets of estimates differ  only because the first stage estimates for the 
coefficients of ESS71 differ. 
Note  that  none  of  the  variables  in  Table  5  appears  with  a 
40 statistically significant coefficient  in any  regression  (although the change 
in wealth variable, CW, does have t-statistics ranging from  1.8 to 1.9).  In 
each  case,  one  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis that  — 
02 = 0  at  any 
reasonable level of confidence.  The data therefore support the view  that 
individuals rationally process  new information. 
It is worth emphasizing that the CCSS variable has a statistically 
insignificant  coefficient  in  each  of these  equations,  and  that  the  point 
estimates  of  this  coefficient  are  small  in  economic  terms.  Although 
individuals  do  not  appear  to  use all  information contained  in  statutory 
entitlements, they do seem to act rationally towards new information that 
changes statutory entitlments on the margin. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
In  this  paper,  I  have  outlined and  tested a simple theory that 
describes the evolution of expectations concerning social  security benefits 
during  the pre-retirement  period.  While the raw data do  not appear  to 
support the empirically testable implications of this theory,  the evidence 
indicates that this  failure is attributable to the presence  of measurement 
error.  After  correcting  for  the  presence  of  this  error,  I  find  that 
expectations  do  appear  to  evolve  as  a  random  walk,  and  that  the 
innovations  in  this  process  are  unrelated  to  previously  available 
information. 
After  concluding that  the  data  support  the theory,  I  estimate 
responses of expectations to the arrival of new information, and test for 
the rationality of these responses.  The results here are striking.  Although 
41 individuals  do  not  form  expectations  on  the  basis  of  all  available 
information, and in particular ignore much of the information contained in 
concurrent statutory entitlements  to social security benefits, responses  to 
new  information  during  the  period  immediately  preceding  retirement 
appear to be highly rational.  The bulk of information affects the evolution 
of expectations  only  through  its  impact  on  actual  benefit  calculations. 
Furthermore,  the  data support  the view  that  individuals form  accurate 
assessments of the ultimate impact of new information on actual benefits. 
These findings  corroborate more speculative results from Bernheim [1987a] 
which  suggested  that  individuals  formulate  expectations  about  the 
retirment period much more carefully as retirement approaches. 
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44 Table 1: Summary Statistics on Expectations 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
ESS71  2307  881 
E5573  2362  1164 
CESS  55  1229 
SS  2550  1003 
45 Table  2: Tests of Week Rationality 
Equation 
Variable 
1  2  3  4  5 
Technique  OLS  W  W  W-Heckit  W-Heckit 
Intercept  1429  -559  -307  -93.1  -213 
(176)  (1287)  (661)  (879)  (685) 
ESS71  0.400  1.27  1.16  1.37  1.22 
(0.0791)  (0.557)  (0.285)  (0.400)  (0.373) 
MILLS  -897  -314 
(757)  (546) 
46 Table 3: Tests of Strong Rationality 
Variable 
Equation 
1  2  3 
Dependent Variable  CESS  ESS73  ESS73 
Technique  OLS  IV  IV 
Intercept  -3593  -4427  10.2 
(2913)  (6352)  (554) 
ESS71  1.24  0.966 
(0.688)  (0.286) 
ERET71  40.1  51.4 
(46.8)  (50.3) 
DRET71  -2801  -3519 
(3446)  (3708) 
E0171/100  -0.184  -0.230 
(0.173)  (0.335) 
ERET69  8.89  1.51 
(39.9)  (39.0) 
DRET69  -649  -130 
(2920)  (2848) 
E0169/100  -1.92  -1.68 
(2.89)  (3.10) 
(continued) 
47 Table 3 (continued) 
CSS71  -0.102  -0.162  -0.0284 
(0.0744)  (0.202)  (0.0892) 
AGE  49.5  63.0 
(50.8)  (108) 
SAGE  13.8  9.74 
(14.3)  (27.1) 
ED  -3.99  -5.15 
(12.1)  (12.7) 
SED  1.14  -2.84 
(11.5)  (16.4) 
W/104  0.481  -1.05 
(8.41)  (10.2) 
HGOOD  -156  -175 
(141)  (157) 
HBAD  -122  -158 
(223)  (251) 
KIDS  5.18  3.16 
(39.0)  (38.2) 
COMPRET  329  408 
(179)  (200) 
MOVE  -203  -219 
(223)  (259) 
48 Table 4: Estimates of Responses to New Information 
Equation 
Variable 
1  2  3  4 






















































































49 Table 5: Estimates of Response Quality 
Equation 
Variable 
1  2  3 
FIBET  -28.0  33.5  34.1 
(688)  (643)  (655) 
HWOR  473  493  496 
(334)  (347)  (342) 
WIDM  9.95  54.8  50.5 
(232)  (246)  (243) 
\VIDW  -174  -101  -121 
(250)  (270)  (264) 
LJOB  -205  -229  -228 
(139)  (137)  (137) 
GJOB  325  357  348 
(373)  (378)  (376) 
CJOB  -346  -352  -356 
(442)  (442)  (442) 
NMOVE  -178  -186  -186 
(191)  (191)  (191) 
CW/1000  6.68  6.91  6.87 
(3.64)  (3.62)  (3.63) 
CCSS  0.0141  0.0654  0.0532 
(0.103)  (0.122)  (0.118) 
50 